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Renewable energy-based local microgrids are gaining popularity despite the unavailability of low-cost, power efficient, and secure
communication system for its supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. *is research has been carried out to
address this issue along with the additional features such as data uploading to a server through a gateway, local data logging, and
alerting the concerned crew in case of any fault to minimize the outage time. *is paper presents the design of a communication
system for the SCADA system of microgrid. ESP32 with LoRa has been used for communication between two nodes or a node and
central SCADA unit. Communication security has been achieved by implementing AES cryptography. Data authenticity has been
achieved by introducing a unique message authentication code (MAC) for each message. A mesh-like network has been
implemented to improve the LoRa range. ESP32 and dragino-uno based LoRa gateways have been tried for uploading the data to
the server, and local data storage has been achieved using an SD card. *e main controller working as the SCADA unit has the
feature of sending emails. Detailed system design and test results are presented in this paper.
1. Introduction
In Canada, more than 300 communities are in remote areas
and are isolated from the central power grid and only rely on
distributed power generation units. Few of these commu-
nities, e.g., Ramea, NL, have added renewable energy to its
energy mix. To ensure the power quality and control of these
distributed power generation sources, the SCADA system
becomes an integral part of the microgrid network. In the
smart grids (SG) and the microgrid network, the main
challenges for the SCADA system are the lack of low-cost,
secure, and authentic communication systems with mini-
mum power consumption [1–3]. In 2008, the Russian Army
took charge of the Georgian electric grid by controlling the
SCADA system of their grid. *is made them realize the
importance of the security of the communication system for
the microgrid. According to the Wall Street Journal report,
in 2009, spies hacked the control system of the U.S. electrical
grid and disrupted the system [4]. Further, a number of
other articles like [3] have highlighted the concerns about
smart-grid cyber security. *erefore, the communication
system of an electrical grid, specifically, the setup related to
the SCADA system, must have strong resistance against
eavesdroppers and masqueraders. Usually, a communica-
tion system is regarded as secure if it satisfies the following
four features [5, 6].
1.1. Privacy. *e message should be encoded or encrypted
such that only the authorized receiver can read the message.
1.2. Message Authentication. *e message should be au-
thentic, and only the privileged nodes should be able to send
the message. Furthermore, no eavesdropper should be able
to masquerade the receiver by sending fake messages.
1.3. Integrity. *emessage received at the receiver side must
exactly be the same as the sender sent.
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1.4. Nonrepudiation. If there is any alteration in the mes-
sage, whether due to the channel error or attacker’s in-
terference, the receiver must be able to recognize that and
decline the message.
In [7–9], a few techniques have been discussed to address
the communication security issues. In their proposed
methods, a third party is involved to ensure the security of the
communication network or setup, which depends upon the
third-party network to communicate with remote end devices
(REDs). Different encryption algorithms have been proposed
in [10, 11] to secure the communication system using dif-
ferent cryptographic techniques, e.g., shift cipher and sub-
stitution cipher but, for a cryptanalyst, they are too simple to
break or other encryption algorithms proposed in [12, 13]. A
cryptanalyst can easily take the control of the system and can
modify the control messages, as demonstrated in Figure 1. In
Figure 1, an eavesdropper receives the message from the
SCADA unit and modifies the messages and control com-
mand and sends that to the remote end device (RED) pre-
tending to be the SCADA unit and hacks the system. In this
way, control information becomes prone to the eavesdropper
and loses authenticity and security. Specifically, in a smart-
grid network, secure communication between the energy
meters and the SCADA system requires a low cost and a
secure communication setup with improved power efficiency.
To provide remote access, a Raspberry Pi could also have been
used for gateway purposes, just like [14, 15, 16] but, that
consumes 3-4 times more power than this tiny ESP32. In this
paper, we have proposed and implemented a secure and
authentic communication system using an Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) algorithm. It is usually used for
extreme confidential communication purposes, for military
applications which do not involve any third party.
In Section 2, the implementation of different encryption
algorithms on Arduino DRF1276G/ESP32 with LoRa for
communication security have been discussed and compared.
*e comparison criteria are based upon their security and
resistance against attacks. AES algorithm implementation
steps and security have been explained in Section 3. Section 4
explains the local data logging on the SD card and the testing
of the data transmission rate for different spreading factors. It
also visualizes the comparison of received and sent messages
at different spreading factors (at SF-7 and SF-12). In Section 5,
two different gateways have been configured to upload the
data to the server for remote access, and their pros and cons
have been discussed briefly. Range testing and improvements
in transmission range, using a mesh network algorithm, have
been explained in Section 6. In Section 7, the results of AES
and MAC implementation on Arduino DRF1276G LoRa and
ESP32-LoRa have been shown and discussed.
2. Cryptographic Algorithms on Arduino with
DRF1276G LoRa Module
To achieve the previously discussed four features of a secure
and authentic communication system for microgrid, multiple
encryption algorithms were implemented on the Arduino
DRF1276G LoRa module but all cryptographic algorithms do
not provide the equal secrecy level. Figure 2 shows a photo of
the Arduino LoRa module used to implement the ciphers
discussed below with their security against attacks.
2.1. ShiftCipher. In shift cipher, all characters of the message
are shifted by the same number. For example, if the message
is “abcdef” and the shift is by 3 characters, then after shift, “a”
will go to “d,” “b” to “e,” and so on, as demonstrated below.
Plaintext f
Ciphertext e f g h i
edcba
d
As there are only 25 possible shifts, it means that its key
set has only 25 elements, and cipher can easily be decrypted
within 25 attempts [17].
2.2. Affine Cipher. Key set of affine cipher is little bit larger
than substitution cipher. In this technique, the ciphertext is
calculated by solving a simple linear equation under modulo
26 because there are only 26 alphabets.
For instance, “y” indicates ciphertext and “x” indicates
plaintext, and then y� a∗ x+ b, where “a” and “b” are
constants but less than 26. Its keyspace contains possible
values for “b” and the possible values for which are 26 and
12, respectively. So, this cipher could be decrypted within
26×12� 312 attempts [17].
2.3. SubstitutionCipher. Substitution cipher givesmuch better
security than the shift and affine cipher due to large key size. In
the implementation, it is quite similar to the shift cipher but
each plaintext character is not shifted by the same number, e.g.,
Plaintext
Ciphertext d z h k a f
a b c d e f
*e first character could be substituted by any of the
other 25 characters, second character by any of the rest of 24
characters, and so on. In this way, possible key size becomes
|K| � 25 × 24 × 23 . . . . . . 1 � 25! (1)
2.4. Transposition Cipher. In this cipher, the characters are
not substituted, rather they are shuffled with each other














Figure 1: Eavesdropper masquerading the SCADA network.
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Its security depends upon the block size. If a block has
“n” characters, then the key set will have total n! possible
values [17].
2.5. Hill Cipher. Hill cipher is based upon simple linear
algebra, and its feature is that it is not an injective cipher. It is
similar to the affine cipher, and the only difference is that it
works on matrixes and columns of plain/ciphertext rather
than characters. In this cipher, we assign numbers to all
alphabet characters, e.g., a� 0, b� 1 and similarly y� 24 and
z� 25, and use nxn square matrix as a key matrix to get the
column matrix of ciphertext from the column vector of
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will be 60􏼢 􏼣 �
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􏼢 􏼣(mod 26). (2)
However, hill cipher keyspace is mn2 where “m” is the
modulo and “n” is the size of the matrix, despite that it is
vulnerable to chosen plaintext attack [17].
Although all previously discussed cryptographic tech-
niques could be implemented for simple communication
purpose, it could not be used for the SCADA systembecause of
their vulnerability to attack by any cryptanalyst and the limited
number of keyspace. *at is why, we have implemented the
AES algorithm to ensure the security of the SCADA system
which not only has the keyspace of 2128 possible keys but also is
nonlinear in nature and is flexible to change the pattern of
output by changing the number of cascaded encryption
rounds. To implement that, we were not able to use Arduino
with the DRF1276G LoRa module, due to its small flash size
and CPU limitations. To implement AES, we have used ESP32
which has not only enough flash, better CPU, and low cost, but
also has very little power consumption (3.5–5mW).
3. Implementation of AES Algorithm Using
ESP32 and LoRa Module
In this implementation, MAC has been added to authen-
ticate the communication, and AES implemented to encrypt
the message, which is the most secure communication al-
gorithm to all known attacks until now [18]. Figure 3 shows
the flow chart of this implementation. Before sending any
message, first it is encrypted using the AES encryption al-
gorithm, and then, a 64-bit unique MAC is generated from
the plaintext. Finally, the ciphertext and the MAC are
concatenated and sent. Similarly, on the receiver side, first
the MAC and the ciphertext are separated, then the MAC is
verified, and the ciphertext is decrypted to process further.
Figure 4 shows the step-by-step 10 round AES encryption
and decryption. In the AES implementation, after generating
a binary value string from the plaintext, there are four major
steps which are repeated for each round.
3.1.AddingRoundKey. *eXOR sum is calculated by taking
bit-wise XOR of each plaintext bit with respective key bit.
3.2. Substitute Bytes. After calculating the XOR sum, each
byte (the pair of HEX characters) is replaced with the re-
spective Rijndael table (a standard table of 256 values) to
increase the confusion.
3.3. Shift Rows. After substitution, all 16 bytes are distrib-
uted to construct a 4× 4 square matrix. In the resultant
matrix, first row remains unchanged while the rest of the
three rows (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) are rotated left by 1, 2, and
3 bytes, respectively.
3.4.MixColumn. At this stage, the matrix left multiplication
is applied using a standard 4× 4 matrix on the results of shift
row operation.
*is algorithm not only has a large key set (2128 possible
keys) but also is secure from many cryptanalysis algorithms
like differential cryptanalysis, integration, linear, multiset,
and many others like these.
In the AES algorithm, for each round, a new key is
derived from the previous round key and the ciphertext of
the previous round. From the test results, explained in the
next section, it could be seen that each round ciphertext is
entirely different from all others which is due to the
implementation of binary-level encryption. *e confusion
created at each round and the propagation of confusion
from one round to the next round makes it more secure.
3.5. MAC Generation. After the successful implementation
of AES in the countermode, a unique and fixed size (64 bit)
MAC is generated using the plaintext of the message. Its
implementation ensures the authenticity of the message, and
the receiver becomes able to verify whether the message has
been modified by any eavesdropper, channel error, or not.
Figure 2: Arduino DRF1276G with LoRa module used for
implementing cryptographic algorithms.
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4. Data Logging and Data Rate
Data logging is another feature added to this system in order
to have a self-data backup mechanism and to avoid data loss
due to any accidental failure in the communication system.
*e data which are supposed to be coming from local
inverter/wind turbine is time-stamped and are stored after
applying the AES encryption. Subsequently, the received
data after extracting sender/receiver identity passwords and
MAC are decrypted and verified to ensure that the received
message is authentic. Finally, the data are time-stamped and
stored in a separate received data file in CSV format. For the
Plaintext Plaintext














































































Figure 3: Flow chart of the implemented communication process.
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local data storage, the configured SD card console is shown
in Figure 5, and the logged data depend upon storage size
and received data rate.
Although according to [19], the data rate of LoRa is
around 27 kb/second which may go up to 50 kb/second, and
the actual data rate depends upon the spreading factor. LoRa
has six different spreading factors from SF7 to SF12 and is
defined as SF� log 2 (Rc/Rs) with Rc indicating chip rate and
Rs indicating symbol rate [9, 19]. Data rate and range of the
LoRa are SF dependent. High SF gives a better range but with
a lower data rate. High SF also increases the probability of
data loss, loss of authenticity, and the loss of integrity as well.
On the other hand, a lower SF gives a better data rate but it
does not support for long distances. With SF-7, a data rate of
27 kb/second could be achieved while with SF-12, one can
transmit data up to 15 km with a poor data rate of a few
hundred bits per second [20].
When an encryption algorithm is implemented, it also
causes latency in processing [21]. It was observed during the
data rate testing and the implementation of the AES en-
cryption. In Figures 6(a) and 6(b), results show that overall
time lapsed for encrypting and sending a message increases
with increasing SF. Here, the message size was the same for
all SFs, the encryption algorithm (AES) was also the same,
and the increasing time lapsed was only different due to
different spreading factors. From the graph, it could also be
inferred that SF-12 takes approximately three times more as
compared to SF-7. *e relation between time elapsed and SF
was also similar at the receiver end which corroborated this
relation of SF and time elapsed.
Further visualization of this comparison was made by
configuring one ESP32-LoRa with SF-7 and the other
ESP32-LoRa with SF-12. In Figure 6(b), it can be seen that, in
the lower half of the picture when sender and receiver were
both configured with SF-7, the number of messages received
was equal to the messages sent. While in the upper half of the
picture, the sender was configured with SF-12 due to which a
significant difference appeared between the rate of message
sending and receiving (Figure 7).
5. ESP32 versus Dragino Gateways
and Alarming
*e collected data were uploaded to a server for analysis
and storage. To upload the data, two different gateways
based upon ESP32 and dragino were tried but both had
certain limitations. *e configuration of an ESP32-based
gateway is relatively difficult because it is to be configured
as a gateway through coding while a dedicated dragino
gateway is already available in the market with complete
configuration and is more user-friendly. On the other
hand, an ESP32-based gateway is much more cost-
effective and power efficient. It hardly consumes 230–
300mW of power [22], while the dragino gateway takes
around 12W, and it requires 12 V DC for proper func-
tioning while an ESP32 requires only 2.7–3.3 V DC.
Overall, a dragino-based gateway consumes about 30
times more power than that of ESP32. Dragino com-
pensates for this excess power consumption in terms of
many other features. For example, it can serve up to 8
nodes simultaneously by communicating with each node
at a different frequency [23], while ESP32 can support
only 3 such nodes simultaneously.
In Figure 8(a), the configuration of an ESP32 based
gateway is shown, and in Figure 8(b), *e *ings Network
(TTN) data file is shown, in which data are being uploaded
and could be accessed remotely. Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show
the dragino controller with LoRa-based gateway configu-
ration and its profile with the real-time data load.
6. Range Testing and Implementation of
Mesh Network
*e LoRa range was tested deploying one ESP32-LoRa at
Memorial University and taking other EP32-LoRas to the
Signal Hill, as shown in Figure 10. *is setup supported a
noise- and error-free communication for the distance of
3.85 km. Although its range is usually obstacle dependent
and during another testing, it was observed that if the
transmitter is at ground floor in the house window and a
receiver is taken outside in neighboring streets, then the
communication range drastically goes down, and they can
communicate only up to the distance of 500–700m. To
address this issue, a network based upon mesh-like topology
was implemented which gave better results.
Figure 5: Configuring SD card for data logging.
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To implement a mesh topology, each ESP32-Lora
module of the network was assigned a unique identity
code and was also fed with the directory of all other units’
identity code directory. Before sending a message but after
encryption and theMAC addition, the sender adds the target
node identity code and its own identity code in the message
string. *e processing steps done at the receiver side are
shown in the flow chart of Figure 11(a). An idle node goes
into sleep mode for power saving, and whenever there is a
message, it receives and parses the message packet into three
parts:
(a) Sender identity code
(b) Targeted receiver identity code
(c) Message packet with data and MAC information
*e ID of the node is compared with the targeted receiver
ID. If they are equal, this means that the node is the targeted
receiver, and then, the received message packet is further
parsed into encrypted message and MAC. After parsing the
received message, the previously discussed message verifi-
cation algorithm is applied, and after proving message
authenticity, it is decrypted and then executed further. If the
receiver ID is not equal to the targeted receiver ID, then the
message is again packed in a single string as was received and
is forwarded to the other nodes lying in the range.
In this way, if a message is sent from the central control
unit for a node which does not lie in the range of that unit,
then a node in the vicinity of the sender will receive that
message and will forward to the next nearby node. A
complete system flow chart is shown in Figure 11(b). In this








































Time lapsed in receiving, verifying, and decrypting
the message under different SF
Series 1
(b)
Figure 6: Latency for different SF and AES on the (a) sender end and (b) receiver end.
(a)
(b)
Figure 8: (a) Configuring ESP32 as a gateway. (b) Uploading data
on *e *ings Network.
Figure 7: Configuring ESP32-LoRa sender and receiver at different
SF.
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node, and a node of level 1 acts as a bridge for two-way
communication between the control node and level-2
nodes.
After implementing mesh topology, its range was tested
for two levels of nodes, and a significant improvement was
observed. *e nodes whose range was limited to 500–700m
achieved another 500m in their coverage area, and its
results can be seen in Figure 11(c). In this way, the range
which was only obstacle dependent became the function of
the number of levels between the sender and the receiver as
well.
A complete system flow chart is shown in Figure 12. *e
data string (V, I, P, Q, and system health) is collected
through sensors from distributed energy sources (e.g., wind
turbine and solar panel) and their associated inverters. *e
string is then serially fed to the ESP32 unit. ESP32 encrypts
the data and generates a unique MAC address for each
message and adds to the encrypted message string. A unique
identification code of the sender node and targeted receiver
node is also added into that string before transmitting. A
mesh node receives the message if the target node is not in
range and forwards to give better coverage. Finally, when a
message is received at the SCADA unit (targeted node), it
verifies the sender-receiver ID, then parses the packet and
confirms the message authenticity by verifying its MAC and
then decrypts and uploads to the server through gateway
under respective node ID.
Similarly, when a SCADA unit sends a command, it
will first encrypt the message and will generate and add
the MAC address into an encrypted message string and
will also add the sender/receiver ID before sending. *e
receiver will follow the same steps; it will first match its
own ID with the targeted node ID encapsulated in a
message and then will verify the MAC and will decrypt
before execution. If the message is not concerned with the
receiver node, it will act as a bridge between the sender
and the receiver and will transmit the message forward to
improve coverage.
7. Results
All encryption algorithms discussed in Section 2 were tried,
and finally, the combination of the AES algorithm
implemented on ESP32 with LoRa for the SCADA system
was chosen after comparing their security, authenticity for
data, flexibility to change the key, and power consumption of
the controllers. After selecting the AES algorithm, different
controllers were tried and checked their compatibility with
AES. Figure 13 shows the ESP32 with the LoRa module
which costs about C$40 per set, consumes power around
5mW, and supports the implementation of AES algorithm
and AES with MAC as well.
Figure 14(a) shows the results of AES implementation on
Arduino DRF1276G with the LoRa module. *e results
show that this controller cannot support even a single round
of AES implementation due to small flash size and many
other limitations. Finally, the ESP32 board was selected for
this project due to its sufficient flash size and minimum
power consumption.
*e results of AES implementation are shown in
Figure 14(b), in which a nine-round AES has been
implemented on ESP32 with a LoRa module. It could be
seen that the encrypted string is entirely different than the
plaintext string which is due to bit-level changes made in
the string during encryption. Furthermore, imple-
mentation of different numbers of encryption rounds
generates a unique encrypted string which gives an ad-
ditional advantage by increasing complexity. A different
ciphertext for the same message can be generated by
changing either number of rounds or changing key.
Flexibility in changing key was achieved by externally
connected buttons by either changing the number of
encryption rounds or the key.
Figure 14(c) shows the results of the implementation of
AES with MAC on ESP32 with the LoRa module, where
the 192-bit received message is split into the 128-bit
ciphertext and the 64-bit MAC. Decryption is applied on
the ciphertext, and the plaintext is extracted from it after
applying “n” decryption rounds. From that plaintext
again, n + 1 round ciphertext is calculated. An XOR sum
is calculated between alternate bits of n + 1 round ci-
phertext and respective plaintext bits. To check the au-
thenticity of the message, calculated MAC is compared
with the received MAC at the bit level, and even a single
bit change in the received message is also detected in this
comparator.
(a) (b)
Figure 9: (a) A dedicated dragino LoRa gateway. (b) Dragino real time data load.
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Figures 14(d)–14(f) shows the results of one unit from
every level of the mesh network. In Figure 14(d), the
results show that the sender is “Node1” of level 2, the
message is for the SCADA unit, and these addresses are
followed by the encrypted message string and the MAC
address. *e receiver (SCADA) will calculate the MAC
address from the encrypted string and will compare that
with the MAC added after encrypted string to verify the
message authenticity. In the results, the calculated MAC
and received MAC are equal due to which verification
status has been shown “authentic” and the message has
been decrypted to process.
Figure 14(d) shows the results of a node which is acting as
a bridge between the nodes of the level 2 and SCADA unit. It
compares the targeted node ID with its device ID and finds
that the message is for another node and sends the message
forward without changing or processing. *e results of
Figure 14(f) show the results of a message sent from the
SCADA unit, and the targeted node ID is “Node1.”*e string
has the four parts such as sender ID, receiver ID, the
encrypted message, and the MAC.*e verification steps were
followed before processing the message, and the final message
status “authentic” proves the successful two-way communi-

















































Figure 11: (a) Process flow chart for an intermediate level node. (b) Mesh network for improved LoRa range. (c) Range testing after
implementing a mesh network.
Figure 10: ESP32-LoRa range testing.
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8. Conclusion
Implementation of AES cryptography with MAC for the
SCADA system using ESP32 with LoRa was tested. It proved
to be the best method of secured, authentic, and flexible
communication. In a prototype system, a point-to-point
secure and authentic communication has been achieved,
for which the setup costs less than C$40 and consumes
power less than 5mW. *e implemented encryption algo-
rithm (AES) is also the most resistant cryptographic algo-
rithm. It is only vulnerable to brute force attack which
requires 2128 different keys to be tested to ensure the suc-
cessful decryption. Moreover, its range was improved by
implementing it in a mesh network. By implementing this
network, as implemented here on a prototype network, a
secure and sophisticated low-cost, remotely accessible, local,
and remote data logging with broader coverage area using
mesh network can be achieved. It seems to be the best solution
to implement the SCADA system for the distributed oper-
ating units and integrated IoTnetwork to achieve a secure and
authentic communication system. In the distributed power
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Figure 12: Complete system block diagram.
Figure 13: ESP32 with LoRa module used for AES implementation.









10 Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
SCADA system and protects power generation from the
hostile actors, and it can send wireless data over many ki-
lometers with low-cost and negligible power consumption.
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